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Contested electronic signatures: what the platform does not prove

The client swears he did not sign. The other side files the platform's certificate of completion, with IP address, date and hash, and says the matter is closed.

The course

Why this course

Signature levels under Law 14,063/2020, ICP-Brasil (Brazil's public key infrastructure), the audit trail and the frauds the examination finds in contracts signed on screen.

The certificate of completion attests to the platform's process: a link opened, a click recorded, a hash generated. It does not say who was on the other side of the screen. Fraud lives in that gap: a certificate issued in someone else's name, a borrowed token, an email address changed the day before, a genuine signature pasted onto the wrong document.

The STJ (Brazil's Superior Court of Justice) has upheld signatures made outside ICP-Brasil, based on MP 2,200-2/2001 (the Provisional Measure that created ICP-Brasil), art. 10, § 2º. In 2026 it also held that a generic denial is not enough to set aside a digital contract. The debate has moved from "signed or did not sign" to technical evidence: whoever challenges must point to the trace, and whoever defends needs the trail.

The course shows what each signature level proves, how fraud happens and what to request from the platform so that the examination can give answers.

Length2 hours
TrackDigital evidence in litigation
FormatIn person or live online, open class or in-house. Taught in Portuguese, under Brazilian law
Who it is forCivil, banking and corporate litigation lawyers, and contracts, credit and compliance teams that use signature platforms.
InstructorAdriano Vallim, Forensic Expert and Digital Crime Specialist
CertificateCertificate of attendance stating the course hours, for every participant

I want this course

Pick as many courses as you like: they are kept and arrive ticked on the registration form.

By the end, you will be able to

What changes in your next case

  • Identify the signature level and what it proves on its own.
  • Read a certificate of completion and point out what it does not demonstrate.
  • List the data the request must demand from the platform and the certification authority.
  • Recognise the signs of the most common frauds, from the shared token to the digital transplant.
  • Distinguish a valid signature from an intact document.
  • Draft expert questions for electronic signature examinations.
Programme

2 hours, block by block

0:00
Opening: the valid signature the contracting party did not make 10 min
  • The case that opens the course
  • Platform process versus signer identity
0:10
The legal map without myths 25 min
  • Law 14,063/2020 (Brazil's electronic signatures law): simple, advanced and qualified, and the scope of the law
  • MP 2,200-2/2001, art. 10: the ICP-Brasil presumption and other accepted means
  • CPC, art. 784, § 4º (Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure): electronic enforceable instrument without witnesses
  • What the STJ decided between 2024 and 2026
0:35
How an electronic signature is forged 25 min
  • Certificate issued to the fraudster
  • Token, password or A1 certificate shared or copied
  • Email or phone number changed on the platform, link forwarded
  • Digital transplant and PDF altered after signing
1:00
What the examination looks at and what to request 25 min
  • The audit trail, event by event
  • Certification chain, revocation and time stamp
  • Signature coverage of the content and file versions
  • Signatures on a tablet: image or dynamic data
1:25
Exercise: the certificate of completion 20 min
  • Group reading of a fictitious certificate
  • What it proves, what it does not, what to request
1:45
Questions and cases from the audience 15 min
  • Participants' cases, without identification
Cases in class

The cases used in class

REAL CASE · ANONYMISED

The valid signature that was not made by the contracting party

A contract signed on a platform, with a certificate of completion in order, was denied by the alleged signer. The examination looked at the audit trail and the metadata of the transaction. The signature came from a device the contracting party had never used. The certificate attested to the process, not the identity.

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REAL CASE · ANONYMISED

The authentication that failed

In a civil action against a financial institution, the forensic expert acted as party-appointed expert. The analysis of the signature platform revealed flaws in the authentication process and supported a favourable first-instance decision.

Related page →

ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE

The A1 certificate on the finance department's computer

A company is charged under an amendment the partner does not remember signing. The signature is qualified, made with the A1 certificate installed on the finance department's computer, whose password three people know. The signature is valid. The question is who used the certificate.

Practice and materials

Ready to use the next day

Hands-on exercise

In groups, participants receive a fictitious certificate of completion. Using the reading guide, they mark what the document demonstrates, what it does not demonstrate and what data is missing. In 15 minutes, each group delivers the list of data to request from the platform and three expert questions. In the last 5 minutes, the instructor presents the answer key.

Materials provided
  • Chart of the three signature levels: what each level proves on its own and what the examination looks at.
  • Reading guide for the certificate of completion: a checklist to separate process from identity.
  • List of data to request from the platform and the certification authority: what the request needs to name.
  • Question bank for electronic signatures: technical questions to adapt to the case.
  • Practice certificate of completion, with answer key: for training the team.
Questions on the topic
Is a signature made outside ICP-Brasil valid?
It can be. MP 2,200-2/2001, art. 10, § 2º, admits other means accepted by the parties. The STJ held that the certification authority's lack of accreditation does not, by itself, invalidate the signature. What decides is proof of authorship and integrity.
Is it enough for the client to deny the signature?
In banking contracts, the burden of proving authenticity lies with the institution (STJ, Theme 1061). But the Third Panel held in 2026 that a generic challenge is not enough when the bank shows there are no signs of fraud. The challenge needs a specific argument (CPC, art. 436, sole paragraph).
Does the government's official validator settle it?
The validator of the ITI (Brazil's National Institute of Information Technology) checks the status of ICP-Brasil and gov.br signatures. It is a good first check. It does not tell who was at the screen, or whether the token was lent.

Laws and rulings discussed

Law 14,063/2020, arts. 2º, 3º and 4º (Brazil's electronic signatures law)  ·  MP 2,200-2/2001, art. 10, §§ 1º and 2º (Provisional Measure that created ICP-Brasil)  ·  CPC, arts. 411, 436, 784, § 4º (Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure)  ·  STJ (Brazil's Superior Court of Justice), REsp 1.495.920/DF  ·  STJ, REsp 2.159.442  ·  STJ, REsp 2.205.708/PR  ·  STJ, REsp 2.197.156/SP  ·  STJ, electronic power of attorney without ICP-Brasil  ·  STJ, Theme 1061  ·  RFC 3161  ·  ITI validator (Brazil's National Institute of Information Technology)

See also

Electronic Signatures and Digital Contracts →   Digital Questioned Document Examination →   Forensic Services in Banking, Capital Markets and Finance →   See all courses →

Bring this course to your firm

Open class or in-house for your team, in person or online. Tell us the group size and preferred date: you will hear back within 24 business hours.

I want this course

The technical evidence your case requires. The authority courts respect.

Initial feasibility consultation at no cost. Reply within 24h on business days.
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